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ABSTRACT
Recently, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) demonstrate a
considerable vulnerability to adversarial attacks, which can be eas-
ily mislead by adversarial perturbations. With more aggressive
methods proposed, adversarial attacks can be also applied to the
physical world, causing practical issues to various CNN powered
applications. Most existing defense works for physical adversarial
attacks only focus on eliminating explicit perturbation patterns
from inputs, ignoring interpretation and solution to CNN’s intrin-
sic vulnerability. Therefore, most of them depend on considerable
data processing costs and lack expected versatility to different at-
tacks. In this paper, we propose DoPa – a fast and comprehensive
CNN defense methodology against physical adversarial attacks. By
interpreting the CNN’s vulnerability, we find that non-semantic
adversarial perturbations can activate CNNwith significantly abnor-
mal activations and even overwhelm other semantic input patterns’
activations. We improve the CNN recognition process by adding a
self-verification stage to analyze the semantics of distinguished acti-
vation patterns with only one CNN inference involved. Based on the
detection result, we further propose a data recovery methodology
to defend the physical adversarial attacks. We apply such detection
and data recovery methodology into both image and audio CNN
recognition process. Experiments show that our methodology can
achieve an average rate of 90% success for attack detection and 81%
accuracy recovery for image physical adversarial attacks. Also, the
proposed defense method can achieve a 92% detection successful
rate and 77.5% accuracy recovery for audio recognition applications.
Moreover, the proposed defense methods are at most 2.3× faster
compared to the state-of-the-art defense methods, making them
feasible to resource-constrained platforms, such as mobile devices.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have
been widely applied in various cognitive applications, such as image
classification [24] and speech recognition [7], etc. Although effec-
tive and popular, CNN powered applications are facing a critical
challenge – adversarial attacks. By injecting particular perturba-
tions into input data, adversarial attacks can mislead CNN recogni-
tion results. The perturbations generated by traditional adversarial
attacks are fragile, and can only be added into the digital data. There-
fore, they can hardly threaten the recognition systems which obtain
input data from the real world. However, with more advanced meth-
ods proposed, adversarial perturbations can be concentrated into a
small area and be easily attached to the actual objects. Therefore,
these enhanced adversarial attacks can be applied to the physical
world. Fig. 1 shows a physical adversarial example on the traffic
sign detection. When we attach a well-crafted adversarial patch
on the original stop sign, the traffic sign detection system will be
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Figure 1: Physical Adversarial Attack for Traffic Sign
misled to a wrong recognition result as a speed limit sign. Recently,
the problem of such physical adversarial attacks becomes more
severe with increasing CNN based applications [14].
Many works have been proposed to defend against physical ad-
versarial attacks [12, 17, 19, 25, 27]. However, most of them neglect
CNN’s intrinsic vulnerability interpretations. Instead, either they
merely focus on eliminating explicit perturbation patterns from
input [17, 19] or they simply adopt multiple CNNs to conduct the
cross-verification [27, 28]. All these methods have certain draw-
backs: First, they introduce a considerable data processing cost
during perturbations elimination. Second, they can hardly defend
against physical adversarial attacks with model transferability, lack-
ing versatility for preventing different physical adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we proposeDoPa, a fast and comprehensive defense
methodology against physical adversarial attacks. By interpreting
CNN’s vulnerability, we reveal that the CNN decision-making pro-
cess lacks necessary qualitative semantics distinguishing ability:
the non-semantic input patterns can significantly activate CNN and
overwhelm other semantic input patterns. We improve the CNN
recognition process by adding a self-verification stage to analyze
the semantics of distinguished activation patterns with only one
CNN inference involved. Fig. 1 illustrates the self-verification stage
for a traffic sign adversarial attack. For each input image, after one
forward process, the verification stage will locate the significant
activation sources (shown in green circle) and calculate the input
semantic inconsistency with the expected semantic patterns (shown
in the right circle) according to the prediction result. Once the in-
consistency exceeds a pre-defined threshold, CNN will conduct
a data recovery method to recover the input image. Our defense
methodology depends on only one CNN inference with minimum
computation components involved, which can be extended to both
CNN based image and audio recognition applications.
Specifically, we have the following contributions in this work:
• By interpreting CNN’s vulnerability, we find that the non-
semantic input patterns can significantly activate CNN and
overwhelm other semantic input patterns.
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• We propose a self-verification stage to analyze and detect
the abnormal activation patterns’ semantics. Specifically, we
introduce the inconsistency between the local input patterns
that cause the distinguished activations and the synthesized
patterns with expected semantics.
• We adopt two data recovery methods in our defense method-
ology to recover input data which has been attacked.
• Based on the detection and data recovery methodology, we
propose two defense cases for image and audio applications.
Experiments show that our method can achieve an average 90%
detection successful rate and average 81% accuracy recovery for
image physical adversarial attacks. Also, our method achieves 92%
detection successful rate and 77.5% accuracy recovery for audio
adversarial attacks. Moreover, our methods are at most 2.3× faster
than the state-of-the-art defense methods, which is feasible to vari-
ous resource-constrained platforms, such as mobile devices.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORKS
2.1 Physical Adversarial Attacks
The adversarial attack started to arouse researchers’ general con-
cern with adversarial examples, which were first introduced by [11].
The adversarial examples were designed to project prediction er-
rors into input space to generate noises, which can perturb digital
input data (e.g., images and audio clips) and manipulate prediction
results. Since then, various adversarial attacks were proposed, such
as L-BFGS [22], FGSM [11], CW [6], ADMM-based[29]etc. Most of
these adversarial attack methods share a similar mechanism, which
tries to cause the most error increment within model activation
and regulate the noises within the input space.
Recently, such an attack approach was also brought from the
algorithm domain into the physical world, which we refer as the
physical adversarial attack. [10] first leveraged a masking method
to concentrate the adversarial perturbations into a small area and
implement the attack on real traffic signs with taped graffiti. [5] then
extended the scope of physical attacks with adversarial patches.
With more aggressive image patterns than taped graffiti, these
patches could be attached to physical objects arbitrarily and have a
certain degree of model transferability.
Beyond aforementioned image cases, some physical adversarial
attacks also have been proposed to audios. Yakura et al. [26] pro-
posed an audio physical adversarial attack that can still be effective
after playback and recording in the physical world. [26] generated
audio adversarial command in a normal song which can be played
through the air.
Compared to the noise based adversarial attacks, these physical
adversarial attacks reduce the attack difficulty and further impair
the practicality and reliability of deep learning technologies.
2.2 Image physical Adversarial Attack Defense
There are several works have been proposed to detect and defense
such physical adversarial attacks in the image recognition process.
Naseer et al. proposed a local gradients smoothing scheme against
physical adversarial attacks [17]. By regularizing gradients in the es-
timated noisy region before feeding images into CNN for inference,
their method can eliminate the potential impacts from adversarial
attacks. Hayes et al. proposed a physical image adversarial attack
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Figure 2: Audio Recognition and Physical
Adversarial Attack Process
defense method based on image inpainting [12]. Based on the tra-
ditional image processing methods, they detect the localization of
adversarial noises in the input image and further leverage the image
inpainting technology to remove the adversarial noises.
Although these methods are effective for image physical ad-
versarial attacks defense, they still have certain disadvantages re-
garding computation and versatility. For example, local gradients
smoothing requires the manipulation for each pixel of the input im-
age, which will introduce a large number of computation workload.
Moreover, their methods are designed for solving specific adversar-
ial attack which are not integrated for different physical adversarial
attack situations. Therefore, we develop a fast and comprehensive
defense methodology to address the above issues.
2.3 Audio Physical Adversarial Attack Defense
Compared with images, the audio data requires more processing
efforts for recognition. Fig. 2 shows a typical audio recognition pro-
cess and the corresponding physical adversarial attack. The audio
waveform is first extracted as Mel-frequency Cepstral Coefficient
(MFCC) features. Then we leverage a CNN to achieve acoustic fea-
ture recognition, which can obtain the candidate phonemes. Finally,
a lexicon and language model is applied to obtain the recognition
result "open". When the adversarial noise is injected to the original
input waveform, the final recognition result is misled to "close".
Several works have been proposed to detect and defend such
adversarial attacks [20, 27, 28]. Zeng et al. leveraged multiple Auto-
matic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems to detect audio physical
adversarial attack based on a cross-verification methodology [28].
However, their method lacks certain versatility which cannot detect
the adversarial attacks with model transferability. Yang et al. pro-
posed an audio adversarial attack detection and defense method by
exploring the temporal dependency in audio adversarial attacks [27].
However, their method requires multiple CNN recognition infer-
ences which is time-consuming. Rajaratnam et al. leveraged the
random noise flooding to defense audio physical adversarial at-
tacks [20]. Since the ASR systems are relatively robust to natural
noise while the adversarial noise is not, by injecting random noise,
the functionalities of adversarial noise can be destroyed. However,
this method cannot achieve high practical defense performance .
3 CNN VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS FOR
PHYSICAL ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we first interpret the CNN vulnerability by analyz-
ing the input patterns’ semantics with the activation maximization
visualization [9]. Based on the semantics analysis, we identify the
adversarial attack patches as the non-semantic input patterns with
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Figure 3: Visualized Neuron’s Input Pattern by Activation
Maximization Visualization
abnormal distinguished activations. Specifically, to evaluate the
semantics, we propose metrics that can measure the inconsisten-
cies between the local input patterns that cause the distinguished
activations and the synthesized patterns with expected semantics.
Based on the inconsistency analysis, we further propose a defense
methodology consists of the self-verification and the data recovery.
3.1 CNN Vulnerability Interpretation
In a typical image or audio recognition process, CNN extracts fea-
tures from the original input data and gradually derive a prediction
result. However, when injecting physical adversarial perturbations
into the original data, CNN will be misled to a wrong prediction
result. To better interpret the vulnerability, we first analyze CNN’s
vulnerability by using a typical image physical adversarial attack –
adversarial patch attack as an example. Compared with the original
input, an adversarial patch usually has no constraints in color/shape,
etc. Therefore, such the patches usually sacrifice the semantic struc-
tures so as to cause significant abnormal activations and overwhelm
the other input patterns’ activations. We assume that CNN lacks
qualitative semantics distinguishing ability which can be activated
by the non-semantic adversarial patch during CNN inference.
To verify such an assumption, we investigate the semantic of
each neuron in CNN. We adopt a CNN activation visualization
method – Activation Maximization Visualization (AM) [9]. AM
can generate a pattern to visualize each neuron’s most activated
semantic input. The generation process of pattern V (N li ) can be
considered as synthesizing an input image to a CNN model that
delicately maximizes the activation of the ith neuron N li in the
layer of l . Mathematically, this process can be formulated as:
V (N li ) = argmax
X
Ali (X ), X ← X+η ·
∂Ali (X )
∂X
(1)
where, Ali (X ) is the activation of N li from an input image X, η is
the gradient ascent step size.
Fig. 3 shows the visualized neurons’ semantic input patterns by
using AM. As the traditional AM method is designed for seman-
tics interpretation, many feature regulations and hand-engineered
natural image references are involved in generating interpretable
visualization patterns. Therefore we can get three AM patterns
with an average activation magnitude value of 3.5 in Fig. 3 (a). The
objects in the three patterns indicate they have clear semantics.
However, when we remove these semantics regulations in the AM
process, we obtain three different visualized patterns as shown in
Fig. 3 (b). We can find that these three patterns are non-semantic,
but they have significant abnormal activations with an average
magnitude value of 110. This phenomenon can prove our assump-
tion that CNN neurons lack semantics distinguishing ability and
can be significantly activated by non-semantic inputs patterns.
3.2 Metrics for Input Semantic Inconsistency
and Prediction Activation Inconsistency
To identify the non-semantic input patterns for the attack detection,
we aim to compare the natural image recognition with the physical
adversarial attacks.
Fig. 4 shows a typical adversarial patch based physical attack.
The patterns in the left circles are the primary activation sources
from the input images, and the bars on the right are the neurons’
activations in the last convolutional layer. From input patterns, we
identify a significant difference between the adversarial patch and
primary activation source on the original image, which can be used
to detect the adversarial patch. From prediction activations, we
observe another difference between the adversarial input and the
original input, which are their activation magnitudes. Therefore,
we formulate two inconsistencies at two levels:
Input Semantic Inconsistency Metric This metric measures
the input semantic inconsistency between the non-semantic ad-
versarial patches and the semantic local input patterns from the
natural image. It can be defined as follows:
D(Ppra,Por i )=1−S (Ppra,Por i ),Ppra ℜ←−Φ:Ali (p),Por i
ℜ←−Φ:Ali (o), (2)
where Ppra and Por i represent the input patterns from the adver-
sarial input and the original input. Φ : Ali (p) and Φ : Ali (o) represent
the set of neurons’ activations produced by adversarial patch and
the original input, respectively.ℜ maps neurons’ activations to the
primary local input patterns. S represents a similarity metric.
Prediction Activation Inconsistency Metric The second in-
consistency is in the activation level, which reveals the activations’
magnitude distribution inconsistency in the last convolutional layer
between the adversarial input and the original input. We also use a
similar metric to measure it as follows:
D(fpra,for i )=1−S (fpra,for i ),fpra∼Φ:Ali (p),for i∼Φ:Ali (o) (3)
where fpra and Ior i represent the magnitude distribution of activa-
tions in the last convolutional layer generated by the adversarial
input and the original input data.
For the above two inconsistency metrics, we can easily obtain
Ppra and fpra since they come from the input data. However, Por i
and for i are not easily to get because of the variety of the natural
input data. Therefore, we need to synthesize the standard input
data which can provide the semantic input patterns and activation
magnitude distribution. The synthesized input data for each pre-
diction class can be obtained from a standard dataset. By feeding
CNN with a certain number of input from the standard dataset, we
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Figure 4: Image Adversarial Patch Attack
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can record the average activation magnitude distribution in last
convolutional layer. Moreover, we can locate the primary semantic
input patterns for each prediction class.
3.3 Physical Adversarial Attack Defense based
on CNN Self-verification and Data Recovery
Based on the above analysis, we propose a defense methodology
which consists of the self-verification stage and data recovery in the
CNN decision-making process. More specifically, the entire method-
ology flow can be described as following: (1) We first feed the input
into the CNN inference and obtain the prediction class. (2) Next,
CNN can locate the primary activation sources from the practical
input and obtain the activations in the last convolutional layer. (3)
Then CNN leverages the input semantic inconsistency metric and
the prediction activation inconsistency metric to measure the two
inconsistencies between the practical input and the synthesized
data with the prediction class. (4) Once inconsistency exceeds the
given threshold, CNN will consider the input as an adversarial in-
put. (5) After a physical adversarial attack has been detected by the
self-verification stage, the data recovery methodology is further
used to recover the input data which has been attacked. Specifically,
we leverage image inpainting and activation denoising to recover
the adversarial input image and audio. Our proposed methodology
can defend against the physical adversarial attack with only one
CNN inference involved.
We will derive two methods from such methodology for image
and audio applications in Section 4 and Section 5.
4 DEFENSE AGAINST IMAGE PHYSICAL
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
In the last section, we propose the defense methodology which con-
sists of the self-verification stage and data recovery. In this section,
we will specifically describe our proposed defense methodology
against image physical adversarial attacks.
For image physical adversarial attacks defense, we mainly de-
pend on the input semantic inconsistency in input pattern level.
Therefore, we need to locate the primary activation source from the
input image by adopting a CNN activation visualization method
– Class Activation Mapping (CAM) [30]. Let Ak (x ,y) denotes the
value of the kth activation in the last convolutional layer at spatial
location (x ,y). We can compute a weighted sum of the all activa-
tions at the spatial location (x ,y) in the last convolutional layer as:
AT (x, y) =
1∑
K
Ak (x, y), (4)
where K is the total number of activations in the last convolutional
layer. The larger value of AT (x ,y) represents the activation source
in the input image at the corresponding spatial location (x ,y) plays
a more important role during CNN inference.
To achieve CNN self-verification for image attack detection, we
further build the specific input semantic inconsistency metric. Ac-
cording to our preliminary analysis, the input adversarial patch
contains much more high-frequency information than the natu-
ral semantic input patterns. Therefore, we first leverage 2D Fast
Fourier Transform (2D-FFT) [2] to transfer the patterns from the
temporal domain to the frequency domain and thereby concen-
trate the low-frequency components together. Then we convert
the frequency-domain pattern to a binary pattern with an adaptive
threshold. Fig. 5 shows a converted example, including adversarial
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patterns, expected synthesized patterns with the same prediction re-
sult, and natural input patterns. For binary patterns, we can observe
the significant difference between adversarial input and semantic
synthesized input. Therefore, based on the above analysis, we re-
place S(Ipra , Ior i ) as Jaccard Similarity Coefficient (JSC) [18] and
propose our image adversarial attack inconsistency metric as:
D(Ppra,Pexp )=1−JSC(Ppra,Pexp )=
|Ppra⋃Pexp |−|Ppra⋂Pexp |
|Ppra⋃Pexp | , (5)
where Iexp is the synthesized semantic pattern with predicted class.
Ppra
⋂
Pexp means the numbers of pixels where the pixel value of
Ppra and Pexp both equal to 1.
With the above inconsistency metric, we propose our specific
defense methodology which contains self-verification and image
recovery. The entire process of our method is described in Fig. 6.
Self-verification forDetection For each input image, we apply
CAM to locate the source location of the biggest model activations.
Then we crop the image to obtain the patterns with maximum
activations. In the step of semantic test, we calculate the consistency
between Ipra and Iexp . Once the inconsistency is higher than a
predefined threshold, we consider an adversarial input detected.
DataRecovery for ImageAfter the patch is detected, we do the
image data recovery by directly removing patch from the original
input data. To eliminate the attack effects, we further leverage
image inpainting technology to repair the image such as image
interpolation [4]. At last, we feed back the recovery image into
CNN to do the prediction again.
With the above steps, we can detect and further defend an image
physical adversarial attack during CNN inference process.
5 DEFENSE AGAINST AUDIO PHYSICAL
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
In this section, we will introduce the detailed defense design flow
for the audio physical adversarial attacks.
Different from images, the audio data requires more processing
efforts. As Fig. 2 shows, during the audio recognition, the input
waveform needs to pass Mel-frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC)
conversion to be transferred from the time domain into the time-
frequency domain. In that case, the original input audio data will
loss semantics after the MFCC conversion. Therefore, we lever-
age the prediction activation inconsistency to detect the audio
physical adversarial attacks.
More specifically, we measure the activation magnitude distribu-
tion inconsistency between the practical input and the synthesized
data with the same prediction class. We adopt a popular similarity
evaluation method - Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) [3] and
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the inconsistency metric can be defined as:
D(fpre ,fexp )=1−PCC(fpre ,fexp )=1−
E[(fpre−µpre )(fexp−µexp )]
σpraσexp
, (6)
where Ipre and Iexp represent the activations in the last convolu-
tional layer for both practical input and synthesized input. µa and
µo denote the mean values of fpre and fexp , σpra and σexp are the
standard derivations, and E means the overall expectation.
Self-verification forDetectionWith established inconsistency
metric, we further apply self-verification stage to CNN for the au-
dio physical adversarial attack. The detection flow is described
as following: We first obtain activations in the last convolutional
layer for every possible input word by testing CNN with a standard
dataset. Then we calculate the inconsistency value D(Ipra , Iexp ). If
the model is attacked by the audio adversarial attack, D(Ipra , Iexp )
will exceed a pre-defined threshold. According to our preliminary
experiments tested with various attacks, there exists a large range
for the threshold to distinguish the natural and the adversarial
audio, which can benefit our accurate detection.
Data Recovery for Audio After identifying the adversarial in-
put audio, simply denying it can cause undesired consequences.
Therefore, attacked audio recovery is considered as one of the most
acceptable solutions. We propose a new solution - “activation de-
noising" as our defense method, which targets ablating adversarial
effects from the activation level. The activation denoising takes
advantages of the aforementioned last layer activation patterns,
which have stable correlations with determined predication labels.
When the wrong label is detected, we can determine the correlated
activation patterns. By suppressing these patterns in the hidden
layer, the original input emerges. Therefore, we propose our ad-
versarial audio recovery method as shown in Fig. 7: Based on the
detection result, we can identify the wrong prediction label, and
therefore obtain the standard activation patterns of the wrong class
in the last layer. (For the best performance, we locate the top-k
activation index.) Then we can find the activations with the same
index. These activations are most potentially caused by the ad-
versarial noises and supersede the original activations. Therefore,
we suppress these activations to resurrect the original ones. Such
an adversarial activation suppression scheme inherits the defense
methodology we proposed in the image domain.
6 EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our method in terms of its effectiveness
and efficiency in two application scenarios: image and audio physi-
cal adversarial attacks. The CNN models and datasets used in our
experiments are listed in Table 1: For physical adversarial attack
in image scenarios, we test our defense method’s performance on
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Figure 7: Audio Adversarial Attack Defense
Inception-V3 [23], VGG-16 [21], and ResNet-18 [13] using ImageNet
dataset [8]. For audio scenarios, we use Command Classification
Model [16] on Google Voice Command dataset [16].
6.1 CNN Image Physical Adversarial
Attack Defense Evaluation
In this part, we evaluate our proposed defense method for the image
physical adversarial attack scenario. The adversarial patches are
generated by using Inception-V3 as the base model. The generated
patch with high transferability are utilized to attack three models:
Inception-V3 itself and two other models, VGG-16 and ResNet-18.
Then we apply our defense method on all the models and test their
detection success rates. Meanwhile, we also record the time cost
of defense methods to demonstrate the efficiency of our method.
The baseline methods is Blind, which is one state-of-the-art defense
method [12]. And the threshold for inconsistency is set as 0.46.
Table 2 shows the overall detection and image recovery perfor-
mance. On all three models, our method consistently shows higher
detection success rate than [12]. The further proposed image re-
covery could help to correct predictions, resulting in 80.3%∼82%
accuracy recovery improvement on different models while Blind
only achieves 78.2%∼79.5% accuracy recovery improvement. In
terms of efficiency, the process time cost of our detect method for
one physical adversarial attack is from 67ms∼71ms while the Blind
is from 132ms∼153ms.
By the above comparison, we show that our defense method
has better defense performance than Blind with respect to both
effectiveness and efficiency.
6.2 CNN Audio Physical Adversarial
Attack Defense Evaluation
In this part, we evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the
proposed defense method in audio physical adversarial attack sce-
narios. The inconsistency threshold for adversarial detection is
obtained by the grid search and set as 0.11 in this experiment. For
comparison, we re-implement another two state-of-the-art defense
methods: Dependency Detection [27] and Multiversion [28]. Four
methods [1, 6, 11, 15] are used as attacking methods to prove the
generality of our defense method. Fig. 8 shows the overall perfor-
mance comparison.
Our method can always achieve more than 92% detection success
rate for all types of audio physical adversarial attacks. By contrast,
Dependency Detection achieves 89% detection success rate in average
while Multiversion Detection only have average 74%. Therefore, our
method demonstrates the best detection accuracy.
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Table 1: CNN Models and Datasets
Attack Model Dataset
Image Physical
Adversarial Attack
Inception-V3
VGG-16
ResNe-18
ImageNet-10
Audio Physical
Adversarial Attack
Command
Classification
Speech
Commands
Table 2: Image Adversarial Patch Attack Defense Evaluation
Stage Inception-V3 VGG-16 ResNet-18Blind* Ours Blind* Ours Blind* Ours
Detection
Detection
Succ. Rate 88% 91% 89% 90% 85% 89%
Time Cost 132ms 68ms 144ms 67ms 153ms 71ms
Recovery Original Acc. 9.8% 9.8% 9.5% 9.8% 10.8% 9.8%Recovery Acc. 88% 90% 89.3% 91.5% 90% 91%
*:Blind [12]
Table 3: Audio Adversarial Attack Data Recovery Evaluation
Method FGSM [11] BIM [15] CW [6] Genetic [1] Time Cost
No Recovery 10% 5% 4% 13% NA
Dependency
Detection [27] 85% 83% 80% 80% 1813ms
Noise Flooding [20] 62% 65% 62% 59% 1246ms
Ours 87% 88% 85% 83% 521ms
Then we evaluate our method’s recovery performance. The k
value in the top-k index we mentioned above is set as 6. Since
Multiversion [28] cannot be used to recovery, we re-implement
another method, Noise Flooding [20] as comparison. And we use the
original vulnerable model without data recovery as the baseline.
Table 2 shows the overall audio recovery performance evalua-
tion. After applying our recovery method, the prediction accuracy
significantly increase from average 8% to average 85.8%, which
is 77.8% accuracy recovery. Both Dependency Detection and Noise
Flooding have lower accuracy recovery rate, which are 74% and
54%, respectively.
For defense efficiency, since ourmethod is based on the activation
pattern and numerical similarity (which is easy to compute), the
detection can be efficiently done during the CNN forward process.
As the result, the time cost of our method is 521ms while other two
methods usually cost more than 1540ms for each single physical
adversarial attack. Therefore, our defense method is 2∼3× faster
than the other two methods.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a CNN defense methodology for physical
adversarial attacks for both image and audio recognition applica-
tions. Leveraging the comprehensive CNN vulnerability analysis
and two novel CNN inconsistency metrics, our method can effec-
tively and efficiently detect and eliminate the image and audio phys-
ical adversarial attacks. Experiments show that our methodology
can achieve an average 90% successful rate for attack detection and
81% accuracy recovery for image physical adversarial attack. Also,
the proposed defense method can achieve 92% detection successful
rate and 77.5% accuracy recovery for audio recognition applications.
Moreover, the proposed defense methods are at most 2.3× faster
compared to the state-of-the-art defense methods, making them
feasible to resource-constrained platforms, such as mobile devices.
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